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Abstract
The attention for the governance of financial sector supervisors is of a recent
date. The debate has risen to the fore as part of the wider discussion about the
appropriate institutional organization of financial supervision and the drive
for compliance with international best practices in the regulatory field. This
paper takes stock of the regulatory governance debate. We first discuss the
main premise of the paper, that regulatory governance plays a pivotal role in
instilling financial sector governance, which in turn is a key source of
corporate governance in the nonfinancial sector (the governance nexus).
Having established this premise, we identify the main pillars for regulatory
governance-independence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. The
next two sections take a look at where we stand in practice. First, we review
to what extent recent reforms of supervisory structures worldwide are
embracing the four pillars underlying regulatory governance. We find that
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the SUERF Conference “Corporate
Governance in Financial Institutions” held in Nicosia, Cyprus (March 29–30, 2007). The author
would like to thank Martin Balling, discussant at the conference, Martin Čihák, Enrica
Detragiache, Donato Masciandaro, participants at the SUERF conference, and an anonymous
referee for extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Thomas Bonaker, Silvia Ramirez, and
Pinn Siraprapasiri provided skilful research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are the
author’s and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its Management.policy makers are gradually making efforts to improve the foundations for
regulatory governance. However, further convincing, in particular of the
beneficial effects of accountability, seems necessary. Secondly, we review
a number of studies that assess the impact of (aspects of) regulatory
governance on the soundness of the banking system (an indicator of good
financial system corporate governance), or other aspects of the governance
nexus. Most studies show a positive impact of stronger regulatory governance
frameworks on the soundness of the financial system. However, further
empirical evidence to strengthen the case for good regulatory governance
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1. Introduction
While corporate governance in the nonfinancial sector has been receiving
a great deal of attention, both in academic and policy making circles, it is
striking how little emphasis, in comparison, has been put on aspects of
corporate governance of financial institutions, in spite of the general
recognition that the financial sector plays a key role in the economy.
2 Even
lesser attention has been paid to the corporate governance aspects of
regulators and supervisors of the financial system (hereafter called regulatory
governance
3), despite the fact that a majority of scholars and policy makers
would agree that they play a crucial role in preserving financial stability.
4
The need for attention for corporate governance issues in financial institutions
and their supervisors stems from three intimately related reasons. First, the
financial system contributes to the production of a public good-financial
stability. Worldwide experience shows that failure to produce this good is
bound to result in deep and costly systemic crises. Secondly, financial sector
institutions (and commercial banks in particular) pose a number of unique
corporate governance issues for all stakeholders-managers, regulators,
investors and depositors. Third, it is widely accepted that the two
aforementioned reasons combined, justify a level of, and approach to,
regulation and supervision that is qualitatively different from that in many
other sectors that are also involved in the production of public goods (e.g.
utilities). To be able to live up to these high standards of regulation and
supervision, financial sector regulatory agencies need appropriate corporate
governance arrangements.
2 Leading contributions on financial institutions governance include, in chronological order,
Prowse (1997) as well as a number of other contributions in a special issue of Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro (March 1997), Halme (2000), Caprio and Levine (2002), Harm (2002), Macey and
O’Hara (2003), and a number of contributions in a special issue on the topic of Journal of Banking
Regulation (January 2006).
3 The term “regulatory governance” is being used in two meanings in the literature. Some
authors use the term in reference to the emerging mode of governance of social and economic life
in a large number of countries through regulation. In that sense, regulatory governance is
intimately linked with the notion of a “regulatory state” (for an overview, see for instance Phillips,
2006). In our paper, regulatory governance is used in a narrower sense and refers to the corporate
governance of regulatory agencies as they emerge in the regulatory state.
4 The terms “regulator” and “supervisor” are used interchangeably in this paper, although
strictly speaking they refer to related, but different functions. The main task of the regulator is to
define and implement the regulatory framework, while the supervisor’s main task is to enforce the
regulatory framework and take sanctions against individual institutions in case of noncompliance.In contrast with the corporate governance issues of financial institutions,
which are different in grade and nature from those of the nonfinancial sector,
regulatory governance poses an entirely different set of issues. Regulatory
agencies are relatively new creatures in our liberalized economies, and
policymakers are still trying to position them within the constitutional and
democratic framework. On the one hand, these agencies are extensions of the
government through which the latter regulates the markets (mainly to correct
market imperfections), and yet, on the other hand, they are supposed to
operate at arm’s length from the government. Financial sector regulators are
certainly not the only agencies for whom these questions are pertinent, but for
the reasons indicated above and further discussed in this paper, they occupy
a unique position among the regulatory agencies. In addition, they are in the
midst of redefining and repositioning themselves to meet the challenges
posed by fast-evolving financial systems.
This paper focuses on the why’s and how’s of high quality regulatory
governance. As a stocktaking exercise, the paper tries to answer four main
questions: (i) what makes financial sector regulatory governance so
important; (ii) what are the necessary foundations for achieving good
regulatory governance; (iii) what are the current trends with respect to these
foundations; and (iv) do we see any impact of good regulatory governance
practices on the performance of the financial sector.
In light of the earlier statement that research on this topic is still rather thin,
one may wonder whether a stocktaking exercise is not premature at this stage.
We don’t think so. Alarge number of countries are in the middle of an intense
debate about the appropriate institutional structure of financial supervision, so
this is the right time to endow these new agencies with appropriate
governance features. The world is moving away at a high speed from the
times when a bank supervisor was a compliance officer. We have entered an
era where the supervisor is a “governance regulator,” i.e. a regulator who
ensures, in a forward-looking manner, that sound governance practices are
applied in the supervised entities. So any stocktaking exercise of emerging
trends and issues is probably welcome and should be helpful in setting out
some beacons to help direct the debate.
To answer the four questions above, the paper is structured as follows. To
fully appreciate the crucial role of financial supervision, section 2 reiterates
the notion of the “governance nexus” which lays out how the quality of
governance arrangements at the different segments of the nexus-public sector,
8 Introductionregulator, financial sector, and nonfinancial firms-has an impact on the quality
of governance at the other segments.
5 As financial sector regulators stand at
the beginning of this nexus, these agencies bear a great responsibility and
their governance arrangements have a demonstration effect (Carmichael
(2002)) on the financial system. Having established this principle, Section 3
identifies independence, accountability, transparency and integrity as the four
prerequisites for good regulatory governance. Section 4 reviews evidence
from recent supervisory reforms. The evidence reveals that governments are
starting to pay attention to these prerequisites. However, it is also noted that
there is certainly not yet a uniformly accepted governance template for
financial supervisory agencies. Section 5 reviews empirical work regarding
the impact of regulatory governance on other segments of the nexus. The
results point fairly unequivocally in the direction of a positive impact of good
regulatory governance practices on the soundness of the financial system.
However, more research is needed to persuade the unconvinced. So, this
section concludes with some suggestions for further research. Section 6
brings together the conclusions.
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5 In this context the term “governance nexus” was first coined by Das and Quintyn (2002) and
Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004).2. Regulatory Governance and the “Governance Nexus”
In today’s economies the quality of corporate governance at the level of each
individual agent in a nation’s economy has become one of the most important
contributing factors to economic performance, growth and development. The
significance of governance can best be analyzed if we model the economy for
the purpose of this paper as consisting of three groups of agents: the public
sector, which includes the regulators, the financial sector, and the
nonfinancial firms.
The notion of a “governance nexus” brings out the idea that the quality of the
corporate governance in each of these three groups of agents has a critical
impact on the quality of the governance in the other groups, and, in the end,
on the performance of a country’s economy as a whole.
6 This section brings
together theoretical and empirical insights in the working of this nexus. The
main purpose is to highlight the pivotal role of financial sector regulation and
supervision in the operation of the nexus. The notion of a nexus also implies
that a country’s corporate governance system is only as strong as its
individual components, i.e. the weakest link has a strong impact on the
outcomes for the economy as a whole.
Corporate governance of nonfinancial firms
Few topics have received as much attention in the past decade and a half, as
corporate governance of firms. This growing attention stems from a number
of developments. First, worldwide economic liberalization has reduced, by
definition, the impact of government interference in business in general and,
thus, has put more responsibilities in the hands of owners and managers of
corporations. Addressing these growing responsibilities has put the spotlight
squarely on strengths and weaknesses in governance arrangements which had
hitherto somewhat remained out of the limelight. Secondly, the transition of
the economies of the former Soviet Union to market economies confronted
scholars and policymakers face-on with the need for solid corporate
governance arrangements in order to make these new market economies
function properly, reduce corruption and promote equality. Finally, a number
11
6 This is far from claiming that the causality is unidirectional from governance to economic
performance. The literature on economic growth and development amply demonstrates that the
linkages are far more complex. The entire debate about governance only underlines its importance
as one of the contributing factors for economic growth and development.of big scandals in industrialized countries around the turn of the century
further heightened the discussions about the quality of corporate governance
arrangements, even in countries, such as the US, which had been considered
for a long time as having solid arrangements.
From a theoretical point of view, it has been evident since Berle and Means
(1932) and Coase (1937), that the neoclassical description of a firm as
a homogeneous agent that maximizes a utility function needed to be enriched
by identifying the various agents that interact at the level of a firm
(shareholders, managers, stakeholders), as well as their preferences. Thus, the
corporate governance problem was identified as an agency problem-the
separation of ownership and control. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state it in
their excellent survey “corporate governance deals with the ways in which
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on
their investment.” Behind this “down-to-earth” presentation of the problem is
the key issue that the quality of corporate governance is in the end a critical
determinant of whether a firm, or the productive sector of an economy in
general, can raise funds to produce goods and services efficiently. This ability
has a clear and direct impact on every nation’s economic performance, growth
and development. Thus, corporate governance is crucial and central to
understanding economic growth in general, and the role of the financial factor
therein, in particular (Levine (2004)).
7
The standard theory (Berle and Means (1932)) states that corporate control is
exerted by diffuse shareholders, by directly voting on crucial issues (mergers,
liquidations, business strategy), and by electing the board of directors to
represent their interests and oversee management. However, one of the main
conclusions of Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) survey is that in large parts of the
world, a number of market frictions actually prevent the diffuse
shareholdership from effectively exerting corporate governance. They find
that, instead, large equity holders and large debtholders-more specifically
banks-are the primary sources of corporate governance.
8
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7 In a recent paper, De Nicoló, Laeven and Ueda (2006) empirically assess the impact of
changes in governance quality on aggregate and corporate growth and productivity in the period
1994-2003. One of their main conclusions is that improvements in governance quality are found
to have a positive and significant impact on traditional measures of real economic activity.
8 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Caprio and Levine (2002) cite a long list of reasons why the
diffuse shareholders cannot effectively exert corporate control: (i) large information asymmetries
between managers and small shareholders; (ii) lack of expertise and incentives on the part of the
latter to close the information gap; (iii) boards of directors that are captured by management and
therefore do not represent the small shareholders; (iv) voting rights that do not work because
managers have wide discretion over flows of information; and (v) legal systems that do not protect
the rights of minority shareholders, or that do not properly enforce these rights.The key role of financial intermediaries in improving corporate governance
of the borrowers was first modeled by Diamond (1984). Diamond defines
“delegated monitoring,” as one of the key functions of financial
intermediation. Financial intermediaries collect savings from individuals and
lend these resources to firms. In doing so, savings are realized on aggregate
monitoring costs and the free-rider problem (among depositors) is eliminated
because the intermediary does the monitoring on behalf of all investors. This
solves the incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. In addition, as
financial intermediaries and firms develop long-term relationships,
information acquisition costs are further lowered over time.
Despite some shortcomings, Diamond’s model has been considered a great
step forward in formalizing the central role of banks in monitoring
nonfinancial firms.
9 Other authors have built upon this model (for an
overview, see Levine (2004)) and shown that well-functioning intermediaries
more generally, have a central role in boosting corporate governance in the
nonfinancial firms. Given the prevalence of banks in many financial systems
around the world, it follows that banks are a critical source of corporate
governance of their borrowers, for capital allocation, and thus for industrial
and economic expansion. So the first link in the governance nexus is between
financial institutions-more specifically banks-and the nonfinancial sector.
10
Some scholars (see e.g. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)) go as far as claiming
that the role of the banking sector as a source of governance for the
nonfinancial sector is its most important role, and indeed the only role that is
uniquely performed by banks as financial intermediaries. It is recognized that
banks play a number of (other) significant roles in the economy-notably the
transformation and liquidity creation function, mobilization and pooling of
savings, and providing ex-ante information about investments and capital
allocation, but these roles are not necessarily unique for the banking system.
They can be-and in fact are-performed by other agents as well, whereas their
role as a key source of governance is in fact unique to them.
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9 Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Prowse (1997) for instance point out that the model
focuses on debt only and cannot explain outside equity. However, Prowse notes that it is not clear
whether inclusion of equity would change the results of Diamond’s model.
10 Banks are certainly not the only players in this regard. Securities markets also play a part,
but given the evidence presented by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that large share- and debtholders
de facto have a greater influence, the role of banks dominates. On the relative strengths and
weaknesses of banks and markets as a source of corporate governance, see among others, Levine
(2004).Governance of financial institutions
Diamond (1984) was the first to note that the financial institutions’ task of
“delegated monitoring”-of being a major source of corporate governance-puts
a special burden on their corporate governance-the issue of “who monitors the
monitor?” Indeed, if the role of the financial sector as a guardian of good
governance practices at the (nonfinancial) firm level is so crucial, the quality
of their corporate governance matters significantly.
More recently, a second reason why the quality of corporate governance in
financial institutions matters, has gained prominence. Financial institutions
play a key role in attaining and preserving a country’s financial stability,
generally accepted as an important public good. So, because financial
stability provides the foundations on which economic growth and
development can thrive, corporate governance of the financial system
contributes in two ways to a country’s economic performance.
Having established the importance of high quality corporate governance of
financial institutions, we now turn to the specific issues related to their
governance. There is a growing consensus that banks face corporate
governance issues that are different in grade and nature from those that
nonfinancial firms face. In light of the importance of bank corporate
governance, these issues require special attention and specific solutions.
The main reason that attention for this topic is of a recent date is that financial
systems were, by and large, among the last economic sectors to be liberalized.
Since the mid-to-late-1970s, financial sector liberalization has unleashed
a number of interrelated forces-competition, technological innovations, and
more risk-taking-which undoubtedly have complicated their governance and,
thus, brought to the surface the existence of anumber of financial sector-specific
governance issues. In addition, the large number of bank insolvencies in the
1980s and 1990s, where corporate governance problems were identified as
a contributing factor, has further intensified the interest in the efficiency and
effectiveness of the governance systems of banks (Prowse (1997)).
The corporate governance problems for managers, investors and depositors of
financial firms stem from a number of unique features of their operations and
operating environment (Prowse (1997)), Caprio and Levine (2002), Harm
(2002), and Macey and O’Hara (2003)):
14 Regulatory Governance and the “Governance Nexus”● First of all, banks are opaqueorganizationsandtheirrisksarecomplex. While
information asymmetries are present in all sectors, they are more pronounced
in financial institutions, notably banks. The nature of their business makes it
simply more difficult for outside investors to assess their ongoing
performance. The opaqueness creates a number of problems for equity and
debt financiers alike, and causes a number of governance mechanisms to
become less effective than in the nonfinancial sector: (i) with greater
informational asymmetries, it is very difficult for diffuse equity and debt
holders to monitor bank managers. While debt holders (depositors) have
always been diffuse by the nature of the banking business, the current trend of
financial institutions becoming much larger, is also diminishing shareholder
control. Tošovský (2003) notes that ownership has become more dispersed,
majority shareholders have become more interested in their investment than in
operating control, and as a result, only few shareholders are able to influence
or control the bank; and (ii) opaqueness makes governance by competition
more difficult, and thus less effective in the banking industry than in the
nonfinancial industry. Takeovers as a sanction are likely to be less effective
because insiders typically have more information than potential purchasers.
● Secondly, by the nature of their business, banks are atypical category of firms
where  shareholders and stakeholders have interests. The stakeholder
philosophy is discussed in detail in Tirole (2001). His point is that any party
with significantly specific assets committed to the firm will demand property
rights. The recognition of depositors as stakeholders who deserve an allocation
of property rights adds another level of complication to bank governance. If
we combine these rights with the finding in the first bullet, that these
stakeholders are dispersed and typically not well informed, we start to get
a clear picture why bank governance is more complicated than corporate
governance in a nonfinancial firm. To deal with the issues posed by the
opaqueness of the banking business and the complexity of its risks, a number
of internal and external safeguards have gradually been put in place. On the
internal side, it has been suggested that board and management oversight
mechanisms be established, as well as mechanisms for internal control and
internal audit.
11 Externally, accounting requirements and external audits have
been imposed, rating agencies established, and last but not least, prudential
regulation and supervision promoted. Among these safeguards, regulation and
supervision undoubtedly play a pivotal role, a point that will be further
elaborated below. Before doing that however, athird feature deserves attention.
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11 The BIS has been instrumental in promoting a number of these safeguards. See in particular
BIS (2006), as well as the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP).● The reference to regulation and supervision by the government leads to
a third reason why bank governance is complex and different from the
standard corporate governance model: the relationship between the
financial system and the government. Indeed, despite widespread
liberalization of the financial sector, governments remain more involved in
the financial sector than in most other sectors of the economy. This
involvement can take many forms. First, in the previous bullet it was
pointed out that the role of the government as regulator and supervisor is
justified to fill voids in the financial institutions’governance mechanisms.
Furthermore, in many countries the government provides additional
protection to the (small) depositors through deposit insurance and stands
ready with lender-of-last resort support to avoid systemic crises. Finally,
several countries still have a significant presence of government
owned-banks (although the numbers have been shrinking significantly over
the past decade). While the first two types of government involvement are
typically seen as remedies against weak governance in financial institutions
or their consequences, it needs to be recognized that they can potentially
complicate and weaken bank governance, rather then remedy them. First,
an ill-designed regulatory framework can undermine financial sector
governance mechanisms, instead of strengthening them. Because this topic
goes to the heart of the discussion in this paper, it will be further developed
later in the paper. The same argument goes for deposit insurance. The pros
and cons of such protection are the subject of intense debate. Several
scholars see it as a type of government intervention that weakens corporate
governance mechanisms as it reduces the incentives of depositors to
monitor banks and gives an incentive to banks to take more risks.
12 Others
claim that limited deposit insurance can be effective and have minimal
interference with bank governance, if properly designed and implemented
at the right time.
13 Likewise, ill-designed lender-of-last resort facilities can
also undermine corporate governance of banks (Heremans (2007)). Finally,
it is also generally recognized that government ownership of financial
institutions could easily lead to conflicts of interest situations and weak
governance with the government being owner and regulator.
The above step-by-step analysis of bank governance problems can be
summarized as follows: the nature of the banks’ operations (opaqueness and
complexity) renders some standard governance mechanisms less effective.
16 Regulatory Governance and the “Governance Nexus”
12 For a representative paper of this school of thought, see Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002).
The authors argue that increased risk-taking by banks owing to an explicit deposit insurance
system manifests itself in an increased probability of experiencing a systemic banking crisis.
13 For an overview of best practices and trends, see Hoelscher, Taylor and Klueh (2006).The banks’ mandate and their governance are further complicated by the
combined presence of shareholders and (diffuse) stakeholders. To ensure
effective bank governance, governments have stepped in through regulation
and supervision.
Thus, regulation and supervision are the central elements of the answer to the
initial question-who monitors the monitor. From here, it is only one small step
to conclude that the primary role of regulation and supervision is to
strengthen the governance of the financial institutions, by addressing in
particular their specific governance issues-those that cannot be effectively
addressed by standard governance mechanisms.
This view of regulation is closely aligned with Dewatripont and
Tirole’s (1994) “representation hypothesis” of regulation.
14 Prudential
regulation “...is primarily motivated by the need to represent the small
depositors and to bring about an appropriate corporate governance for banks.”
(p.35) This view sees the supervisor as performing the role of one important
stakeholder in the banks’corporate governance (Halme (2000)), representing
the set of diffuse stakeholders, i.e. the depositors. From this, it follows that
bank regulation becomes part of the overall corporate governance regime of
banks (Harm (2002) and Adams and Mehran (2003)). In such a framework,
bank governance consists of two parts (Harm (2002 and 2007)): the regulators
ensure debt governance, and shareholders ensure equity governance.
15,16 As
a result, bank managers have to serve two masters, the shareholders and the
regulators, the latter representing the bulk of the uninformed stakeholders.
These governance arrangements thus induce, or force, management to
internalize the welfare of all stakeholders, not just shareholders (Tirole
(2001)).
17
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14 See also Harm (2002 and 2007) and Alexander (2006) for similar views.
15 Harm (2002) also notes that equity governance typically dominates in normal times, while
debt governance dominates in bad times.
16 Wood (2006) tends to disagree with this complementarity view. He argues that the
importance of bank regulation-because of its negative effects on banking and the fact that there is
always a tendency to circumvent them-should be downplayed, and that governments instead
should strengthen bank governance (by law, by contract) to achieve the goals that are now pursued
through bank regulation.
17 The thrust of this discussion has been in terms of corporate governance of banks, and their
supervision and regulation. However, as Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) claim, the representation
hypothesis of regulation and supervision also holds for other financial intermediaries, in particular
pension funds, insurance companies and securities market participants. These institutions also
count among their creditors, large numbers of small debt holders who need to be represented.
What is different however, is the degree of opaqueness of these institutions and the degree of
complexity of their operations. To the extent that risks are smaller for the small debt holders,
a lighter regulatory and supervisory framework can be established.Regulatory governance
A majority among scholars agrees on the rationale for financial sector
regulation because of the specific functions the sector fulfills in the economy
and because of the specifics of the financial system’s operation (see among
others, Goodhart (1998a), Llewellyn (1999) and (2001)).
In the framework established in this paper, we have stated that one of the unique
roles of banks is to be a source of governance for nonfinancial firms.
Regulatory and supervisory agencies, who step in to address weaknesses in the
banks’governance frameworks, should thus in the first place be “governance
regulators”-regulators that derive their rationale for existence primarily from
the correction of imperfections in the governance of banks. The implication of
the latter is obvious: in order to fill the voids in the banks’ governance in
a credible manner, supervisors themselves need to set a credible example, i.e.
have agood governance framework. So, the next chain in the governance nexus
is now established and the next section will focus on how to establish high
quality regulatory governance-to create the proper incentive structure for the
supervisors to promote good corporate governance in the supervised entities,
so that these can play their role as delegated monitors. We should remind
ourselves here that, if rules and regulations are ill-designed, and supervision is
weak-and by extension if other government interventions are ill-designed-bank
governance is further complicated or undermined, instead of cured.
Public sector governance
Before we turn to that next section, we need to highlight the final segment of
the governance nexus. Regulators and supervisors obviously do not operate in
a vacuum. They are influenced and conditioned by the economic and political
realities surrounding them. This is tantamount to saying that the broader
concept of public sector governance can make or break regulatory
governance. We adopt the following definition of public sector governance,
suggested by Kaufman, Kraay and Ziodo-Lobaton (2000):
“The traditions and institutions that determine how authority is
exercised in a particular country. This includes (1) the process
by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored
and replaced; (2) the capacity of governments to manage
resources efficiently, and to formulate, implement, and enforce
sound policies and regulations; and (3) the respect of citizens
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them.”
18 Regulatory Governance and the “Governance Nexus”The quality of public sector governance not only makes or breaks regulatory
governance, it has pervasive effects on all aspects of the chain. There is
abundant empirical evidence showing that corruption, weak rule of law, weak
institutions, such as the legal and judicial system have a negative impact on
corporate governance in all layers of the society.
18 Good public governance is
almost a precondition for good governance in the rest of the economy. The
latter includes the absence of corruption, a sound approach to competition
policies, effective legal and judicial systems, and an arm’s length approach to
government ownership.
The governance nexus
To sum up, the “governance nexus” provides an intuitive presentation of an
important economic reality: in our modern, liberalized market economies, the
quality of governance at each layer of the economic machinery has an impact
on the quality of governance at the other layers. Chart 1 visualizes the chain.
The solid lines in the middle of the flow chart show the virtuous impact to be
expected from good governance at each level. The chart shows the crucial
position of the financial sector regulator, and thus the crucial role of
regulatory governance. The triangular presentation of the nexus points to
another feature with importance for the analysis of this paper: the
mechanisms of “delegated monitoring” and of the “representation
hypothesis” underline that the responsibilities at each layer in the chain are in
the hands of fewer agents than in the next layer. While this, in principle,
should facilitate the coordination problem, it also shows an increasing
responsibility the higher one goes in the triangle.
Behind the accolades on the right of the chart we list a (nonexhaustive)
number of bad practices that may emerge in the presence of weak corporate
governance at the various levels of the nexus. They are all well-known and
are all bound to undermine financial stability and economic performance. The
multiple financial crises of the 1990s and early 2000s, without any exception,
had roots in weak governance practices at some or various levels of the nexus.
Starting from the top of the chart, there is ample empirical evidence to
underscore the point that weak public sector governance leads to weak
regulatory frameworks. Weak public sector governance is also bound to make
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18 See, among many, for instance, Mauro (1995) and Kaufmann et al. (1999).intermediation more expensive as banks will charge higher costs to hedge
against potential losses stemming from weak legal and judicial systems. Weak
public sector governance is also typically associated with political capture by
enterprises and financial firms and with politically connected banks (and
firms).
Another symptom of countries with weak public sector governance is
interference in the supervisory process, leading to forbearance and weak
enforcement. Absence of checks and balances in the government system also
opens the door to regulatory capture (a special form of political capture).
19
At the next level, weak regulatory governance opens the door to weak
financial sector governance which surfaces under numerous forms such as
insider lending, connected lending, and weak risk-management practices.
These practices disturb the allocation of capital and hold back economic
performance and growth.
20 Regulatory Governance and the “Governance Nexus”
19 Hardy (2006) argues that regulatory capture is not always negative. In an environment with
weak banks (typically the result of weak governance at higher levels of the triangle) banks may
try to force the supervisor to establish stronger regulations and apply stricter enforcement in order
to protect their business from systemic contagion. Related to this is the role that foreign banks
often play in weak systems: they have a demonstration effect on the supervisor (and other banks)
by promoting good governance practices. There is empirical evidence of the virtuous effects of
these mechanisms.
Chart 1: Regulatory Governance and the Governance Nexus3. How to Achieve Good Regulatory Governance
The recognition that financial regulators occupy an important position in our
modern, corporate governance-driven economies is being reflected in the
growing attention that academic and policy-making circles are paying to the
institutional and governance features of financial sector regulators. Without
exaggeration, one can state that financial regulators are “emancipating” as an
agency, after having been neglected for decades.
20 In the past decade and
a half, a great number of countries have restructured their supervisory
agencies and have started to pay attention to governance features.
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The attention for the organization of supervision and for supervisory
governance is to a very large extent in response to the developments in the
financial system outlined above. However, on the other hand, this attention
also needs to be seen as part of a broader attention that is being given to the
emergence of regulatory agencies in various sectors of the economy. For most
countries, the concept of a regulatory agency that operates at arm’s length of
the government is a new phenomenon indeed. Majone’s (1993 and 2005)
overview of the origin of regulatory agencies within the government structure
demonstrates clearly that, until recently, outside the United States, there is no
well-rooted tradition of delegating government tasks to regulatory agencies,
let alone independent ones-central banks being the only exceptions since the
1980s. The United States have a longer tradition, but their agency-culture
cannot be easily transplanted to other countries. So, most countries are now
accepting that in their liberalized economies, independent agencies with
specific mandates have become a necessary component of effective
governance. However, the fact that such agencies are accepted, does not
imply that governments are not struggling to fit these new institutions into
their constitutional and political systems. Endowing them with the right
governance attributes is one of the great challenges in this regard. So we are
witnessing a growing literature, with contributions from political scientists,
economists and public administration experts on the position of this new
21
20 In the pre-1970s environment of largely repressed financial systems there was hardly a need
for them to perform the tasks put forward under the “representation hypothesis.” Hence, regulation
and supervision was of far lesser importance than it is now. Supervisors were rather box-checking
(compliance) officers, whereas now they have evolved into “governance supervisors”.
21 There is a growing body of literature reviewing and analyzing these trends and
developments. For comprehensive overviews see for instance, Carmichael, Fleming and
Llewellyn (2004), and Masciandaro (2006).generation-type of agency within the government structure as well as on their
governance attributes.
22
To  define the governance attributes of regulatory agencies, it is useful to
reiterate the OECD definition of what corporate governance involves:
“The set of relationships between a company’s management, its
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate
governance also provides the structure through which the
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.”
(OECD (1999))
Although the above definition is in the first place geared toward private sector
companies, it provides a useful starting point to identify the underpinnings of
regulatory governance, as it also allows us to draw a number of parallels with
private sector governance.
Starting from the above definition, Das and Quintyn (2002) identified four
essential pillars of good regulatory governance: independence, accountability,
transparency and integrity.
23 If well-designed, these four principles can
underpin most of the key elements of internal and external governance
arrangements for regulatory agencies. They lay down principles for dealing
with shareholders (the government) and stakeholders (supervised entities,
customers of financial institutions, and the public at large) and for setting up
internal governance arrangements in support of the external ones. They
underpin mechanisms for attaining the agency’s stated objectives and for
monitoring its performance.
Although references to these four principles are seldom explicitly made in the
private sector governance literature, some parallels can be easily made: the
need for an arm’s length relation between managers and shareholders in the
private sector finds its parallel in the need for independence for the regulator
from the share- and stakeholders (government and supervised industry,
respectively). In this regard, Majone (2005) and Quintyn and Taylor (2007)
drew a parallel between the fiduciary relationship between managers and
22 How to Achieve Good Regulatory Governance
22 For recent contributions and overviews, see for instance Christensen and Lægreid (2006),
Crew and Parker (2006) and Vibert (2007). For criteria as to when to establish agencies separate
from the government bureaucracy, see Alesina and Tabellini (2004).
23 See also Carmichael (2002). His emphasis is mainly on independence and accountability.shareholders on the one hand and regulators and their stakeholders on the
other hand. To be effective, these fiduciary responsibilities of managers need
to be complemented with accountability arrangements between them and the
owners and other stakeholders. Furthermore, transparency mechanisms are
there to facilitate accountability, and integrity measures to avoid conflicts of
interest. One point of difference-or emphasis-is that regulatory agencies, and
in particular financial supervisors, have a greater number of stakeholders than
private nonfinancial firms. To meet the requirements of this group, in our
view accountability needs to assume a greater role for government agencies
than for private firms (see also below).
As can already be observed from the discussion above, a major feature of this
quartet of pillars is that they reinforce each other. Weakening one of them
tends to undermine the effectiveness of the others, and in the end, the quality
of the agency’s governance. The next sections briefly highlight the main
features of these four pillars.
Independence
Quintyn and Taylor (2003 and 2007) discuss the why’s and how’s of
independence for financial regulators. As a starting point for good
governance, the regulatory agency should be insulated from improper
influence from the political sphere and from the supervised entities. A fair
degree of independence from both sides will increase the possibility of
making credible policy commitments.
Having said this, it should be stressed that agency independence can never be
absolute. In our political systems, these “unelected officials” are an integral
part of the government system and need to share the government’s broad
objectives and responsibilities. This important premise is further emphasized
by the fact we identify independence as a pillar of regulatory governance, and
not as an end in itself.
Quintyn and Taylor (2003) argue that independence for financial sector
regulators should cover the regulatory and supervisory aspects of the work,
i.e. the essential parts of their mandate. These two should be supported by
a fair degree of independence in institutional and budgetary matters. Elements
of internal governance (composition of board(s), selection of board members,
functions of boards, voting rights of board members, collegial nature of board
decisions) need to be in place to support the external independence
arrangements.
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Accountability is the indispensable, other side of independence. Yet it is
a problematic one, because policymakers and agencies seem to have trouble
getting a practical grasp of its workings. Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005)
and Quintyn and Taylor (2007) discuss the virtuous interaction between
independence and accountability, and present a set of practical arrangements
for financial regulators. Briefly, these papers argue that accountability can be
thought of as fulfilling at least four functions:
24
● provide public oversight, its classical role. The agency needs to “give
account” of the way it pursues its mandate and objectives;
● maintain and enhance legitimacy. Only if the actions of a fiduciary have
legitimacy in the eyes of the political principals, the regulated firms, and
the broader public can it use the granted independence effectively. If the
agency’s actions are perceived as lacking legitimacy, its independence will
not be long lasting. Legitimacy can be generated through various
accountability mechanisms and relations. Accountability permits the
agency to explain the pursuit of its mandate to a broader public. This is
essential to build understanding of, and broad-based support for, the way
it performs its duties, and hence provides a necessary precondition for
strengthening its reputation. At the same time, accountability
arrangements provide a public forum in which different stakeholder
groups can make representations about agency policies.
25 By creating
opportunities for transparent and structured public influence, the
incentives for private influence are reduced. Once it has been accepted that
accountability generates legitimacy, and legitimacy supports
independence, it becomes clear that the relationship between
accountability and independence does not imply a trade-off, but is one of
complementarities;
26
● enhance integrity of public sector governance; this should be the outcome
of the dynamics between accountability and the other three prerequisites;
and
24 How to Achieve Good Regulatory Governance
24 See also Bovens (2004).
25 This function of accountability is consistent with the “representation hypothesis” of
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). Supervisors are accountable to those they represent.
26 The concept of a ‘trade-off’ is flawed to the extent that it assumes that stronger
accountability mechanisms must necessarily mean a less independent regulatory agency. The
point made here is that accountability strengthens independence.● improve agency performance. Accountability is not only about
monitoring, blaming, and punishment. It is also about enhancing the
agency’s performance. If properly structured, accountability lays down
rules for subjecting decisions and actions of the agency to review. Thus,
by reducing the scope for ad hoc or discretionary interventions, the
agency’s performance can be enhanced. In addition, by giving account to
the government, the agency provides input to the government as to how to
(re)shape its broader economic and financial policies. The agency has
a domain of expertise that it should share with the government. In this
sense, accountability stimulates coordination with the government and
enhances the agency’s legitimacy, without encroaching on its
independence.
Finally, the line between accountability and control remains very thin-leading
to another set of misunderstandings about the arrangements. Following Moe
(1987) the purpose of designing accountability arrangements is to put in place
a combination of monitoring arrangements and instruments, so as to arrive at
a situation where no one controls the agency, but the agency is nonetheless
‘under control,’ i.e. it can be monitored – not just by the government, but by
other stakeholders as well-to see if it fulfills its fiduciary obligations.
Transparency
Transparency refers to an environment in which the agency’s objectives,
frameworks, decisions and their rationale, data and other information, as well
as terms of accountability are provided to the stakeholders in
a comprehensive, accessible, and timely manner (IMF (2000)).
Transparency has increasingly been recognized as a “good” in itself, but it
also serves other purposes related to the other components of governance. As
a “good” in itself, policy makers have been recognizing that it is a means of
containing market uncertainty. In addition, transparency has become
a powerful vehicle for countering poor operating practices and policies.
Transparency has become a main conduit of accountability to a large number
of stakeholders (Lastra and Shames (2001)).
Integrity
Integrity is often the forgotten pillar. Yet, it is an essential one as it provides
several of the underpinnings for good internal governance in support of the
external elements (Das and Quintyn (2002)). Integrity refers to the set of
How to Achieve Good Regulatory Governance 25mechanisms that ensure that staff of the agencies can pursue institutional
goals without compromising them due to their own behavior, or self-interest.
Integrity affects staff of regulatory agencies at various levels. Procedures for
appointment of heads, their terms of office, and criteria for removal should be
such that the integrity of the board-level appointees (policy making body) is
safeguarded. Second, the integrity of the agency’s day-to-day operations is
ensured through internal audit arrangements, which ensure that the
agency’s objectives are clearly set and observed, and accountability is
maintained. Ensuring the quality of the agency’s operations will maintain the
integrity of the institution and strengthen its credibility to the outside world.
Third, integrity also implies that there are standards for the conduct of
personal affairs of officials and staff to prevent conflicts of interest. Fourth,
assuring integrity also implies that the staff of the regulatory agency enjoys
legal protection while discharging their official duties. Without legal
protection, objectivity of staff would be prone to contest-and staff to bribery
or threat-and the overall effectiveness and credibility of the institution would
suffer.
Mutual reinforcement
A key feature of these four pillars is that they hold each other in balance and
reinforce each other as governance pillars (chart 2). The previous paragraphs
have already illustrated this, and a few more examples should further
reinforce the point. Independence and accountability are two sides of the
same coin. Independence cannot be effective without proper accountability.
Without proper accountability measures in place, agencies (or their heads)
can lose their independence easily in disputes with the government.
Transparency is a key instrument to make accountability work. It is also
a vehicle for safeguarding independence. By making actions and decisions
transparent, chances for interference are reduced. Transparency also helps to
establish and safeguard integrity in the sense that published arrangements
provide even better protection for agency staff. Independence and integrity
also reinforce each other. Legal protection of agency staff, as well as clear
rules for appointment and removal of agency heads, support both their
independence and their integrity. Finally, accountability and integrity also
reinforce each other. Because of accountability requirements, there are
additional reasons for heads and staff to keep their integrity.
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Chart 2: The four pillars of regulatory governance4. What are the Trends?
Having established the key role of financial sector regulators in the
governance nexus, as well as the four necessary pillars for high quality
regulatory governance, the next question is: what is happening in the real
world? Are these principles being embraced now that more attention is going
to the institutional setup of supervisory agencies? Agreat deal of analysis has
recently been devoted to the institutional overhaul of supervisory agencies
around the globe, but the attention for the governance arrangements is just
emerging.
This section mainly draws on one of the few comprehensive studies that has
been done so far in this field. Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor (2007) (hereafter
QRT) analyzed independence and accountability arrangements for a set of 32
supervisory agencies that went in the past decade-and-a-half through
institutional (cum legislative), or purely legislative changes. The survey
compared independence and accountability arrangements as proclaimed in
the laws before and after the reforms in order to get a feel for the trends. The
paper defined 19 criteria to measure independence and 21 for accountability.
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These criteria are derived from the authors’ earlier work on both topics.
28
The main reason for singling out the independence-accountability pair for this
study is that among the four components, they seem the hardest to achieve.
29
Establishing proper independence and accountability arrangements needs
endorsement by the politicians in the enabling legislation. Once independence
and accountability have been established by law, the agency itself is in an
ideal position to make the other two components-transparency and integrity
29
27 See QRT for more details. A rating “2” is given for compliance. A “1” indicates partial
compliance, a “0” noncompliance. In a number of cases, a “-1” was given for what are considered
bad practices.
28 On independence, Quintyn and Taylor (2003 and 2007), and on accountability, Hüpkes,
Quintyn and Taylor (2005).
29 Empirical evidence supports the view that independence and accountability are harder to
implement than the two other pillars. IMF and World Bank (2002) and Arnone, Darbar and
Gambini (2007) both find that Basel Core Principle 1.2 which deals with operational
independence, is one with the lowest number of “fully compliant” assessments (31 countries out
of 116 in Arnone et al.). In addition, in their analysis of the IMF Transparency Code for Bank
Supervisors, Arnone et al. (2007) find that observance of Practice 8 on transparency of
accountability arrangements is lower than observance of the other practices. Although this code is
in the first place about transparency of practices, the lack of transparency often shows the absence
of the practice, supporting the point made in this chapter.arrangements-operational, although anecdotal evidence shows that there is
not always a guarantee that independent agencies will establish sound
integrity principles.
Table 1 reproduces the total ratings and the ratings on independence and
accountability from QRT. Chart 3 provides a scatter-plot of the ratings before
and after reforms and Charts 4 and 5 show the ratings before and after for the
individual criteria in the categories accountability and independence,
respectively. What are the trends?
● There is an unmistakable upward trend in both independence and
accountability throughout the sample. At the individual country-level,
however, trends differ widely. Progress in independence and
accountability is certainly not uniform and in a few cases, we even note
reversals.
● Accountability, starting from a low level (average of 40 percent before),
made the greatest progress (after reforms at 61 percent). Independence
moved from 52 to 68 percent.
● The move toward higher independence ratings has been hindered
by the introduction (or continuation) by some governments of
control-arrangements (such as appointing a minister as head of the board,
or putting a clause in the law allowing the minister to intervene in the
agency’s operation, if necessary). Such arrangements are often introduced
under the name of accountability. However, according to our definition
and views (see above), they are clear control mechanisms that undermine
independence.
This first set of findings demonstrates that the governments’ revealed
preferences only go cautiously in the direction of a full grant of independence
for the financial supervisors. This is, among other things, reflected in the
number of control measures that remain, or are put in place. While more
attention is being paid to accountability than before, this trend may also reveal
in a number of cases a concern that the experience with central banks that are
considered too independent by the political class, should not be repeated. The
German example is telling in this regard (see QRT and Westrup (2007) for
a detailed account): the newly established financial supervisor is less
independent and more accountable than the central bank. In Germany, as the
only case in the sample, the new supervisory agency’s accountability rating is
even higher than the independence rating, and by a wide margin.
30 What are the Trends?Table 1. Independence and Accountability: Overview of Ratings Before and After
Reforms (In percent of benchmark)
Source: Quintyn, Ramirez, and Taylor (2007).
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Total Independence Accountability
Country Before After Before After Before After
Australia 48 71 53 76 43 67
Austria 35 64 37 79 33 50
Bahamas 49 70 66 84 33 57
Belgium 50 76 63 92 38 62
Canada 59 63 55 55 62 69
Chile 56 66 66 66 48 67
China 16 36 13 34 19 38
Colombia 45 70 47 68 43 71
Denmark 45 63 53 63 38 62
Ecuador 55 66 79 87 33 48
Estonia 61 66 82 79 43 55
Finland 34 69 24 71 43 67
Germany 55 63 47 47 62 76
Guatemala 30 35 16 21 43 48
Hungary 34 63 34 63 33 62
Indonesia 41 78 50 95 33 62
Ireland 61 84 76 87 48 81
Japan 51 55 61 47 43 62
Korea 40 53 42 47 38 57
Latvia 61 76 82 87 43 67
Mauritius 51 56 71 71 33 43
Mexico 31 71 18 82 43 62
Netherlands 68 75 79 84 57 67
Nicaragua 58 65 79 79 38 52
Norway 39 58 39 53 38 62
Poland 48 59 42 55 52 62
South Africa 33 54 37 55 29 52
Sweden 58 63 47 47 67 76
Trinidad and Tobago 43 63 58 74 29 52
Turkey 19 71 29 82 10 62
Uganda 40 59 58 66 24 52
United Kingdom 61 76 76 82 48 71
Mean 46 64 52 68 40 61
Standard Deviation 12.7 10.6 20.2 17.7 12.1 9.8Table 2 compares the trends in the governance of the supervisory agencies
according to their location (inside or outside central bank). This table confirms
the previous observation: supervisory agencies that are now outside the central
bank, and in particular the unified ones (all sectoral supervisors under one
roof), enjoy on average less independence and have more accountable
arrangements than the ones who are housed in the central banks. The table also
shows that accountability arrangements in central banks remain the least
developed. These arrangements are typically geared towards the monetary
policy objectives, which are less demanding in terms of accountability.
The hypothesis advanced by QRT to explain these trends rests on
a combination of unfamiliarity and a certain reluctance for granting
independence, two narrowly related factors. Unfamiliarity is certainly at play.
As stated before, the phenomenon of regulatory agencies operating at
arm’s length from the government is new and governments are still exploring
ways to position these agencies in the constitutional framework and give them
the right governance attributes. Chart 3 supports this point: if the
independence-accountability dynamics were fully understood (and accepted),
one would expect most observations more or less along the 45 degree line.
This is not the case. Observations are spread all over the diagram and the
correlation between independence and accountability after reforms remains at
0.26 (insignificant at the 10 percent level). In other words, trial and error
seems to prevail and the revealed preference seems to be to err on the side of
control, instead of independence.
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Table 2. Accountability and Independence: Trends by Location of Institution
(Average rating)
Source: Quintyn, Ramirez and Taylor (2007)
Inside Central  Outside Central  Of Which Unified
Bank Bank Supervision
Total rating
Before 46 46 48
After 64 64 65
Independence
Before 58 51 52
After 73 66 65
Accountability
Before 36 41 44
After 56 62 64This should not come as a surprise. There is no agreed-upon model available
for a financial supervisor. A question that follows naturally from this
observation is: could the arrangements for central banks as monetary policy
agents serve as a model? While both functions (monetary policy and
supervision) play a complementary role in safeguarding financial stability, the
legal objectives and the modes of operation and of decision-making are very
different in both areas. Central banks as monetary policy agents typically
have a well-specified objective (price stability). They have a fairly complete
contract in the principal-agent sense, and independence with respect to the
narrow field of their mandate is therefore widely accepted.
30 Accountability
can be specific and limited in this context. Supervisors on the other hand, are
operating under a highly incomplete contract given the great range of
contingencies that can occur in regulation and supervision, as well as the
difficulty of precisely specifying and measuring their objectives. The great
range of contingencies is certainly one of the reasons why politicians are
reluctant to grant them full independence. So the independence model for the
pursuit of monetary policy objectives should be considered unique and not
necessarily ready for simple duplication.
However, there seems to be more at play than just unfamiliarity with the
agency model and its governance. Charts 4 and 5 plot the ratings for the
individual criteria for accountability and independence before and after
reform. Chart 4 shows the progress with regard to the accountability
arrangements. While accountability arrangements before reforms were, by
and large, limited to 7 arrangements, we now have a wider range of
arrangements, spanning the entire spectrum of stakeholders (before, the
arrangements in use were the classical ones, reflecting mainly lines of
accountability towards the government). The chart also shows the decisive
impact of the internet. Websites have made transparency less expensive, from
which accountability has benefited.
31 Newer areas such as accountability
towards consumer boards and the public at large are still in their infant stages,
but they are being considered.
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30 For more details regarding this comparison, see Hüpkes, Quintyn and Taylor (2005).
31 As the most striking example, disclosure of policies and supervisory decisions (through the
website) has jumped from the bottom to the top of the ranking.The independence chart is where we see signs of reluctance. First, on the
institutional side, several agencies have government officials on their policy
boards (either as chair or as member) and several laws give the minister (of
finance) the right to intervene in the operation of the agency if deemed
necessary. Second, on the mandate, we observe a lingering reluctance to give
the agency the sole right to issue and withdraw licenses. In a (limited) number
of cases, the agency does not have the full power to impose sanctions or
enforce them. Finally, a fairly significant number of supervisors still do not
enjoy legal immunity for actions undertaken in good faith, which also
undermines their independence to act against noncomplying banks.
The reluctance to grant full independence to the supervisory agency –
expressed in the desire to exert direct control over the agency, or by keeping
a say in important supervisory decisions such as licensing or withdrawing
licenses – hints to the fact that politicians have lingering doubts (or fears)
about ceding their entire influence over the financial system. Such tendencies
can be explained by reference to Alesina and Tabellini (2004) who model the
politicians’choice between keeping government functions under their control
or delegating them. The model shows that governments are reluctant to cede
those functions to (independent) agencies which in their opinion provide
opportunities for redistribution or political rent-seeking. The financial system
has traditionally served these purposes well through mechanisms such as
directed lending and networks of politically connected banks. Financial sector
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Chart 3. Scatter Plot of Ratings Before and After Reforms
Source: Quintyn, Ramirez, and Taylor (2007).liberalization has created obstacles to the use of such manipulative techniques
and the existence of political connections. So, influence through the
regulatory and supervisory process is seen as a last resort by some
governments to keep their interests alive.
32
In sum, recent developments are sending a mixed message. On the one hand,
the idea that solid independence and accountability arrangements are
keystones for regulatory governance seems to be embraced in general. On the
other hand, policy makers are still struggling with a number of nontrivial
issues. In the interest of further improvements in regulatory governance, the
policy agenda seems to contain at least two critical topics. First, efforts should
be undertaken to make decision-makers better understand the role of
accountability and its dynamics with independence. This seems to be the key
to many of the lingering issues identified in the survey discussed above. More
confidence in accountability and a further elaboration of the arrangements
will be beneficial for regulatory governance. The second topic is harder to
tackle. Research needs to continue to demonstrate that the “grabbing hand”
view of regulation and supervision does not provide the right incentives to
regulators, and weakens the governance nexus and thus, in the medium and
long run, financial stability and economic performance.
What are the Trends? 35
32 In this view, the reluctance of governments to provide sufficient independence to supervisors
is associated with the “grabbing hand” view of the government. This view states that government
regulations are their to favor certain interest groups and political constituencies, and not the
general interest. See Shleifer and Vishny (1998). For applications of this view to the financial
























































































































































































.5. What are the Effects?
The final question that this paper wishes to address is the following: is the
greater attention for the quality of regulatory governance at the policy level
showing an impact on the various elements of the governance nexus as we
would expect on the basis of the theory. Empirical research on this topic is
popping up, although the field is still thinly populated. This paper reviews
some of the work undertaken so far and tries to provide some input into the
research agenda going forward.
Given the focus of this paper, we limit ourselves to those studies that focus on
the impact of regulatory governance (or aspects thereof) on the upstream
elements of the governance nexus (governance and soundness of banks,
financial stability, and economic performance more generally). As such, we
excluded from this review (i) a number of studies that analyze the origins of
recent systemic crises (even though some of them also look at governance of
the supervisors); and (ii) studies that measure the impact of improvements in
financial institutions corporate governance on the quality of governance in the
nonfinancial firms, or on economic performance in general.
Eleven papers fall within the above defined domain, all of them written in the
current millennium, which underscores how recent the debate is. Most of the
studies originate from World Bank and IMF staff, most likely because of the
involvement of both institutions in the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) which undertakes the assessments of the various international
standards and codes.
33 The results of these assessments have become
a bountiful source of information for this type of analysis. In addition, the
database by Barth, Caprio and Levine (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)) is
one of the most detailed databases on supervisory frameworks and practices.
Table 3 provides an overview of the relevant studies. They can roughly be
divided into six types of analysis. The first one assesses the impact of public
sector governance and the quality of institutions on the financial system
(1 study in this group). The second group analyzes the impact of regulator
41
33 The Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP), the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Insurance Core Principles (ICP), the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation (OPSR), and the IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies IMF (2000).governance on the soundness of the financial system or the access of
nonfinancial firms to finance (2). The third group studies the impact of
compliance with standards and codes on measures of financial system
soundness (4). While this third approach does not introduce any measure of
the quality of regulatory governance as explanatory variable, implicitly they
assume that agencies with higher quality governance are also more compliant
with the various standards and codes. So a positive impact of compliance with
standards and codes is seen as an indication that the agency is well-run. In
fact, there is thus far only one study, which fields our fourth category, and
which tries to empirically assess this assumption, by linking the quality of
(elements of) regulatory governance with the compliance with the BCPs. The
fifth category tests the relationship between the institutional structure of the
agency (unified versus sector-specific agencies, whether or not in the central
bank) and the compliance with standards and codes. Two studies fall under
this heading. The sixth category covers 1 study assessing the impact of
regulatory and supervisory features on financial sector performance and
development.
Overview of findings
Public sector governance and financial soundness
The evidence of a positive and significant impact of the quality of institutions
and public sector governance on financial soundness is quite compelling, and
by now generally accepted. Kaufman (2002) identifies strong and significant
effects of a series of variables related to the quality of the public sector on
indicators of financial soundness (after controlling for GDP per capita).
Specifically, the study finds that the variable “control of corruption”
dominates all other governance components, including the “quality of
regulation.” His work also finds that the quality of financial regulation is
significantly influenced by the “control of corruption” variable. So this study
sets the tone in corroborating two parts of the nexus. The same study also
provides evidence of regulatory and political capture by powerful financial
and nonfinancial firms, based on survey results.
While only one study on the impact of public sector governance on the
financial system was retained, several studies in the other categories below
introduce variables on the quality of institutions and public sector governance
as control variables in their equations and their findings strongly support
Kaufmann’s findings.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tRegulatory governance, financial soundness, and obstacles to finance
Moving on to the next step in the nexus-the heart of the discussion in this
paper-only two studies so far have measured the impact of the quality of
regulatory governance on financial soundness. Das, Quintyn and Chenard
(2004) used the framework laid out in this paper and constructed an index of
regulatory governance based on the quality of independence, accountability,
transparency and integrity, derived from standards and codes assessments
under the FSAPs. They find a positive and significant impact of the quality of
regulatory governance on financial soundness.
34 Moreover, the interaction
term between public sector governance and regulatory governance showed
that the positive impact of regulatory governance was stronger in
environments with sound public sector governance, a finding that is in line
with Kaufmann’s findings.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) proxied regulatory governance by
defining three competing views on the supervisory philosophy (“official
supervision” view, “political/regulatory capture” view, and “independent
supervision” view) and relating them to a measure of obstacles to finance by
firms. Their main findings are that the “official supervision” model is
consistent with the existence of obstacles to finance, i.e. chokes the banking
and nonbanking sectors. On the other hand, they find that the “independent
supervision” model is conducive to fewer obstacles to finance. While the
authors include only one of the four pillars of regulatory governance in their
analysis, they find evidence that an arm’s length relation with the government
improves the quality of supervision and removes obstacles to finance.
Compliance with standards and codes and financial soundness
Assessing the impact of compliance with regulatory standards and codes on
the soundness of the financial system is the most popular area of research
related to the topic discussed here. Most researchers have stayed with the
impact of BCP compliance on some measure of soundness of the banking
system.
Only a few have ventured out into the other standards and attempted to
estimate the impact of compliance with them on the soundness of the
supervised entities. Several reasons explain this: after all, in most countries
banking systems are the key sector within the financial system, the sector is
46 What are the Effects?
34 Financial soundness is an index composed of the aggregate capital adequacy ratio and the
share of nonperforming loans in total loans.more homogeneous than the others which facilitates analysis and
interpretation, and more data are readily available.
The earliest attempt to assess the impact of BCP compliance was by
Sundararajan, Marston and Basu (2001). They could not identify a direct
impact. Indirectly, they found that compliance has an impact on bank
soundness via interactive effects with relevant macro variables. This paper,
which came early in the process of standard and code assessments, suffers
from its small sample. Podpiera (2006) in contrast, working with a larger
sample and therefore able to use more sophisticated techniques and
robustness tests, showed that higher degrees of BCPcompliance have positive
effects on the quality of bank assets and also lower the net interest margin.
The work of Demirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006) comes in
general to the same conclusions as Podpiera’s. However, they also dissect the
BCP assessments in an effort to find out whether various parts of the
regulatory framework have a different impact on bank soundness. The
conclusion is that compliance with those regulations that have a bearing on
disclosure and transparency-in particular principle 21-has the most significant
impact on financial sector soundness.
35 This is in line with the findings of
Beck, et al. (2003).
Das et al. (2005) use a different and broader approach. They construct an
index of the quality of financial policies in two sectors (banking and
securities) based on the BCP and IOSCO assessments and measure its impact
on an index of financial stress. The latter is based on Illing and Liu (2003)
who define financial stress as a continuous variable, the extreme realizations
of which occur in the panic/crash phase.
36 They find that the level of financial
stress of a country is influenced by government budgetary deficits and the
terms of trade index, and that the quality of financial policies in general
mitigates their negative impact.
Seen from the topic of this paper, these papers adopt an indirect and implicit
way of measuring the impact of the quality of regulatory governance. The
approach assumes that compliance with BCPs is a result of good regulatory
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35 Principle 21 states that “Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the
supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank, and must publish
on a regular basis financial statements that fairly reflect this condition.”
36 The index of financial stress is constructed from variables that reflect symptoms of financial
system disruption, including (i) falling asset prices; (ii) exchange rate depreciation and/or losses
of official foreign reserves; (iii) insolvency of market participants; (iv) defaults of debtors,
including sovereign defaults; (v) rising interest rates; and (vi) increased volatility of financial
market returns.governance, which is possible but needs empirical underpinning. This
notwithstanding, the approach certainly has its own merits and yields useful
insights into the dynamics underlying the governance nexus.
Regulatory governance and compliance with standards and codes
Only one paper, Arnone, Darbar and Gambini (2007) has attempted to bridge
the gap mentioned in the preceding section and estimates the link between
regulatory governance and compliance with standards and codes. Based on
correlations between indices of independence, accountability and transparency
(derived from various elements of the BCP and IMF Transparency Code) on
the one hand, and an index of compliance with the BCP principles pertaining
to effective supervision, the authors find that (a) agencies with high BCP
compliance are also highly transparent; and (b) that independent agencies tend
to have a more effective supervisory framework. However, their analysis does
not allow to determine causality.
Institutional structure and compliance with codes.
Two recent papers attempt to estimate the impact of the institutional structure
of supervision on compliance with standards and codes. Arnone and Gambini
(2007) perform simple correlation analyses between the supervisory
architecture (integrated (or unified) supervisor, sector-specific supervisors,
central bank involvement) and find that integrated supervisors tend to have
higher compliance with BCPs. Fully integrated supervisors, located in the
central bank have the highest compliance ratios according to their study.
Čihák and Podpiera (2007) take this approach one step further, by introducing
in the analysis not only BCP compliance, but also compliance with securities
and insurance standards (IOSCO and IAIS). Their regression analysis shows
that integrated supervisors have (statistically significantly) higher compliance
ratios both with regulatory governance principles (mainly independence) and
quality of supervision principles. Their results on regulatory governance are
consistent with the findings of QRT i.e. that integrated supervisors score
higher than other supervisory structures.
Regulatory and supervisory framework and financial sector performance and
development
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) present an extensive battery of tests based
on their supervisory database. The focus is not on regulatory governance per
se, but since the study touches upon the “philosophy” of supervision we
48 What are the Effects?include it in this overview. They first test two competing theories of
government regulation: the helping-hand approach (regulation is there to
correct market failures), and the grabbing-hand approach (governments
regulate to support political constituencies). In addition they assess the impact
of an array of regulatory and supervisory practices on financial sector
performance and development. In general, they conclude that any type of
intrusive regulation and supervision does not help in alleviating market
failures, but in general leads to more corruption and hampers financial sector
development. On the contrary, approaches that help empower private sector
monitoring of banks, foster financial development. The latter finding is
consistent with Beck et al. (2003) and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006).
In sum
This domain of research is clearly still waiting for a comprehensive approach.
Several authors have lifted the veil on a number of aspects of the issue before
us, so any attempt to draw conclusions at this stage is like trying to figure out
what the final picture of the puzzle will look like, while we are still missing
a number of pieces. Even with this caveat in mind, the emerging picture
seems fairly coherent: better regulatory governance principles lead to better
supervisory practices which have a beneficial impact of financial sector
soundness. In addition, there is empirical support that the new generation of
supervisory agencies (the reformed ones) adheres to higher regulatory
governance standards and that supervisory practices that foster private market
monitoring by promoting transparency have a positive impact. The greatest
consensus, not surprisingly, exists on the impact of public sector governance
on financial sector soundness. The effects of the quality of public sector
governance and of institutions in general, even dominate the impact of the
quality of regulatory governance in a number of studies.
Having said this, the missing pieces of the puzzle are as important as the
pieces that we already have. More evidence is needed to assess the impact of
the quality of regulatory governance of financial system soundness. To build
up this evidence, the research agenda should probably focus on the following
issues:
● The impact of the quality of regulatory governance on financial system
soundness has only been tested a few times. The sample used by Das,
Quintyn and Chenard was small, which had an impact on the robustness of
the results. An extension of the survey data in QRT could open new
avenues for research.
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findings. Several authors test for causality, but even then admit that
reverse causality cannot be totally excluded. Relevant questions in this
regard are: What is the relative impact of public sector governance and
regulatory governance? To what extent is the quality of regulatory
governance influenced by the soundness of the financial system and by the
degree of development of the economy?
● Most evidence thus far is gathered through de iure approaches (as opposed
to a de facto approach). Countries may have high compliance ratios on
paper, but implementation and enforcement may be weak, something that
cannot always be brought out in the BCP assessments. While having in
place a balanced regulatory framework is a strong indication of good
governance practices, it is no guarantee. Governments may have agreed,
under international pressure, to adopt a strong regulatory framework, but
may not have given the agency the governance mechanisms to enforce it
consistently, for instance. It is the presence of good governance practices
that will provide the agency with the right incentives to implement and
enforce their regulatory and supervisory framework. More research is
needed on these linkages.
37
● Further refinements on the choice of the dependent variable are useful but
not as critical as some of the other issues. Two types of regressions have
been run, with different interpretations. One is to focus on the output of the
supervisory process. Securing financial sector soundness is the main
objective of the supervisor. There is no common view as to how financial
soundness should be measured. So experimenting is healthy. Authors have
been using a range of dependent variables (including capital adequacy,
nonperforming loans, interest rate spreads) on the basis of which they
composed an index, or estimated the impact on each of them separately to
check for consistency in the results. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006) took
a different route by using Moody’s financial strength ratings.
38 Given that
these ratings should include the abovementioned elements, this could be
a promising route, at least for the advanced countries. Measuring the
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37 We recognize that the measurement of the quality of regulatory governance, as for instance
done in Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004) and QRTis also based on a de iure approach. So in weak
institutional environments supervisors may have the right incentives, and the right instruments,
but the environment may not be conducive to high quality supervision (or we may not see the
results of high quality supervision reflected in the soundness of the banks).
38 Das, Quintyn and Chenard (2004) compared their aggregate soundness index (based on
CAR and NPL levels) with Moody’s ratings and found that the differences were small.impact on outcomes should also be encouraged to test the impact on more
remote legs in the governance nexus (as Beck et al. (2003) did). Measuring
the impact on financial stability has not been attempted yet, probably
because of the definitional and measurement problems with this concept.
As time goes by, and more data become available, several of the above issues
will be easier to address. Samples will become larger, both over time and
geographically. As time goes by, more evidence will become available to
compare the impact of changes in the regulatory governance framework over
time. Related to that, we also need to bear in mind that reforms themselves
(e.g. in the governance framework) need time to take root-it takes a number
years to build up credibility in the markets-and that it takes time before the
impact of these reforms is being felt in financial sector soundness indicators
and further down the governance nexus.
What are the Effects? 516. Conclusions
Little has been written about regulatory governance and its role. By taking
stock of where the debate stands, both in theory and practice, the paper
attempts to advance the understanding of the importance of regulatory
governance, of its essential pillars, and of the issues that are surfacing in
countries that are changing the governance arrangements of their financial
supervisors.
The paper started from the premise that the financial sector is a key source of
corporate governance in the nonfinancial firms of the economy, and that
financial supervisors have a great responsibility in promoting and instilling
good governance practices in the financial sector so that the latter can fulfill
its role. The existence of these linkages-in this paper labeled the “governance
nexus”-also implies that financial sector regulators have the right incentive
structure, or in other words appropriate governance arrangements, to live up
to these responsibilities. We reiterated that regulatory governance should be
based on four pillars, or principles: independence, accountability,
transparency and integrity. We showed that these four complement and
reinforce each other.
From there, the paper went on to see what the evidence in the real world is:
in those countries that have undertaken work to modify the regulatory
governance framework of their financial supervisors, are these four principles
being embraced, and what are the (controversial) issues that surface? Related
to this, do we discern any impact of changes to the regulatory governance
framework to the other segments down the governance nexus-in particular on
the soundness of the financial system (the first point of impact and an
important indicator of good financial sector corporate governance)?
With respect to the first question, from the recent QRT survey (which focused
on independence and accountability) we learn that there is indeed a trend to
endow supervisory agencies with more independence and accountability.
However, the survey also reveals that policy makers are still struggling with
this new agency model, and that there is a reluctance to grant more
independence, most likely because the workings of accountability are not
always fully understood. The survey also notes a lingering reluctance on the
part of the political class to cede the responsibility over some parts of the
regulatory framework to regulatory agencies. Going forward, the top of the
53agenda lists the need to improve the understanding of all stakeholders of the
workings of accountability as the mechanism to make independence effective,
while at the same keeping the agency’s work in line with the
government’s broader economic and social objectives.
On the second question, emerging empirical evidence fairly unambiguously
demonstrates that improvements in regulatory governance, among others by
implementing more adequate regulatory frameworks, have a beneficial
impact on the soundness of the financial system. This is encouraging and
underlines the importance of pursuing the agenda on regulatory governance
outlined above. Since modifications in governance and regulatory
frameworks, as well as in supervisory practices, need time to take root, and
need even more time to sort positive effects on financial sector soundness, it
can be expected that in a few years from now, more positive findings will
further underscore the case for good regulatory governance.
This stocktaking exercise has revealed that the regulatory governance
discussion is still in its early phases. While we seem to have the four
principles for regulatory governance right, and while actual implementation
in a good number of countries seems to follow this path, more thinking and
explaining needs to be done to convince all stakeholders to ensure that
financial supervisors have the right incentives in place to fulfill their role in
the governance nexus.
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